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STEARNS, District Judge.   
 Petitioner Jeton Sutaj, an Albanian national, challenges a ruling of the Board of 
Immigration Appeals (BIA) upholding an Immigration Judge’s determination that he is 
ineligible for relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT)1.  We find no error and 
therefore deny the petition.   
I. Background 
                                              
  This disposition is not an opinion of the full court and, pursuant to I.O.P. 5.7, 
does not constitute binding precedent. 
 
 
 1 Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment 
or Punishment, opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20 (1988), 




 Sutaj attempted to enter the United States on March 4, 2015, at John F. Kennedy 
Airport in New York using a counterfeit Italian passport.2  He was intercepted by officers 
of the Department of Homeland Security (DHS), who eventually ascertained Sutaj’s true 
identity and nationality.  He subsequently pled guilty to the false use of a passport in 
violation of 18 U.S.C. § 1546, for which he received a six-month prison sentence. After 
Sutaj’s release from custody, DHS initiated removal proceedings.  Represented by 
counsel, Sutaj sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under CAT.  
 Sutaj claims that he had worked “as [a] soldier of [the] Guard[] of [the] Republic 
of Albania,” which, among other duties, provides security for the country’s Prime 
Minister and President. (AR at 593).  Sutaj maintains that he was recruited by a local 
police chief (Dritan Lamaj), as an undercover operative.  In that capacity, he spent 
several years participating in an investigation of Arben and Mark Frroku, two Albanian 
brothers who are the alleged masterminds of a far-flung criminal enterprise involving 
prostitution and drug trafficking.  According to Sutaj, the brothers were at the time 
wanted for murder in Belgium.  Over the course of the investigation – in which he 
secretly recorded personal and telephone conversations – Sutaj claims that on several 
occasions he was present when the Frroku brothers met with high-ranking Albanian 
government officials.  Although the details are sketchy, Sutaj claims that the meetings 
                                              
2 Sutaj was attempting to take advantage of the expedited admissions procedure 
offered to citizens of certain specified countries under the Visa Waiver Program (VWP).  
Italian citizens are eligible; Albanian citizens are not.  
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included discussions of money laundering and promises of senior government positions 
for members of the Frroku crime syndicate.  
 Before the Immigration Judge (IJ), Sutaj testified that, in December of 2012, he 
was driving with Lamaj from a stakeout of the Frroku brothers, when their vehicle was 
blocked by a Mercedes SUV.  Sutaj recognized the occupants of the SUV as members of 
the Frroku brothers’ security entourage. The security guards emerged from the SUV 
pointing pistols and machine guns at Lamaj and Sutaj, although Lamaj managed to speed 
off, allowing the two men to escape unharmed.  Sutaj continued his work for Lamaj until 
January of 2013, when Lamaj told him that he had been ordered by two senior police 
officials to turn over his files on the Frroku brothers.  He also informed Sutaj that the 
officials had inquired into Sutaj’s identity.  At Lamaj’s urging, Sutaj took refuge in 
Iballë, his native village near Pukë in northern Albania. 
 On February 24, 2013, Sutaj learned that Lamaj had been assassinated by one of 
the Frroku brothers. Over the next two years, Sutaj came to believe that his life was 
increasingly at risk because several times “some luxury car with unknown persons came 
to the . . . village . . . and they were asking if anybody knows a boy with the name 
Jeton[].” (AR at 252).  He also became convinced that persons associated with the Frroku 
brothers had learned his identity from Lamaj’s secret files.   
 According to Sutaj, he remained in hiding in Pukë between 2013 and 2015, 
although he admits to having made trips to Italy and to Montenegro using his Albanian 
passport.  At one point after Lamaj’s death, while driving to visit his sister, a small car 
blocked his way and its three occupants began shooting at him, although Sutaj escaped 
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unscathed.  He claims to have reported the incident to local police, but did not mention 
his suspicion of a connection with the Frroku brothers for fear that the police were on 
their payroll.  Instead he fled Albania in 2015, setting his sights on the United States. 
 The IJ held an initial merits hearing on February 8, 2016. Sutaj, speaking through 
an Albanian translator, testified consistent with what is set out above.  The IJ issued her 
first ruling on March 8, 2016, denying Sutaj’s requests for asylum, withholding of 
removal, and CAT protection. The IJ found Sutaj’s testimony to be credible, despite some 
inconsistencies,3 but denied his asylum and withholding of removal requests because he 
had failed to establish a “well-founded fear of persecution” on any of the recognized 
statutory grounds.  With respect to the CAT protection claim, the IJ concluded that Sutaj 
“has not demonstrated that specific grounds exist to indicate that the Albanian 
government or other individuals working for the Frroku brothers will torture him upon 
his return” to Albania, and that therefore, he had “not met his burden of showing that 
there is a 50 percent chance or greater that he will be tortured by or at the instigation of or 
with the consent or acquiescence of a public official of Albania.” (AR at 179). 
 The BIA affirmed the IJ’s denial of Sutaj’s applications for asylum and the 
withholding of removal.  However, in a July 13, 2016, opinion, the BIA faulted the IJ’s 
initial CAT decision for insufficient legal analysis and a failure to adequately consider an 
                                              
 3 One somewhat telling note was Sutaj’s failure to admit, until cross-examined on 
the subject, that he had traveled from Albania twice before coming to the United States, 
returning each time without incident.  
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expert witness report offered by Sutaj on the abysmal state of human rights in Albania.  
The BIA remanded the case to the IJ for further proceedings on Sutaj’s CAT claim.   
 After considering additional evidence, including testimony from Dr. Jana 
Arsovska, an expert on organized crime in Albania, the IJ again denied Sutaj’s 
application for CAT protection. The IJ noted that Sutaj had not established that he had 
been tortured in the past, and that Dr. Arsovska’s report and testimony, while amply 
establishing the sinister influence and power of the Frroku brothers and their criminal 
network, provided no details specific to Sutaj or his alleged undercover police work. The 
IJ further noted that Sutaj had not been called as a witness in any criminal prosecution 
against the Frroku brothers4 and that no member of his family in Albania had been 
harmed or threatened by the Frrokus, much less by any Albanian government official.  
 On April 14, 2017, the BIA affirmed the IJ’s decision.  The BIA concluded that 
“for purposes of establishing eligibility for protection under the CAT, the applicant has 
not demonstrated that upon his removal, it is more likely than not that he will be tortured 
by or with the acquiescence (including ‘willful blindness’) of a public official.”  (AR at 
7).  The BIA agreed with the IJ that Dr. Arsovska’s testimony was “generalized 
evidence” that was “insufficient to establish the applicant’s eligibility for relief under the 
CAT.”  (Id.)  Sutaj filed this timely appeal.5 
                                              
 4 According to Sutaj, Arben Frroku was apprehended in the Netherlands and 
extradited to Albania to face charges for the murder of Lamaj. (See Sutaj Br. at 30 (citing 
news articles)). 
 
5 The appeal is limited to the issue of whether the IJ and the BIA erred in denying 




 When the BIA adopts an immigration judge’s decision and reasoning, we review 
both rulings.6 See Quao Lin Dong v. Att’y Gen., 638 F.3d 223, 227 (3d Cir. 2011).  While 
this Court reviews constitutional claims and questions of law de novo, see Myrie v. Att’y 
Gen., 855 F.3d 509, 515 (3d Cir. 2017), we apply a deferential standard of review to CAT 
claims, under which “administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable 
adjudicator would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,” 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B).  
We will uphold the BIA’s factual findings as long as they are “supported by reasonable, 
substantial, and probative evidence on the record considered as a whole.” Alimbaev v. 
Att’y Gen., 872 F.3d 188, 196 (3d Cir. 2017).   
 To be eligible for CAT protection, an applicant must show that it is “more likely 
than not” that he will be tortured “by or at the instigation of or with the consent or 
acquiescence of a public official or other person acting in an official capacity,” 
Pieschacon-Villegas v. Att’y Gen., 671 F.3d 303, 310-311 (3d Cir. 2011).  We have 
explained that an act constitutes torture for purposes of CAT if it “caus[ed] severe 
physical or mental pain or suffering . . . [was] intentionally inflicted . . . for an illicit or 
proscribed purpose . . . by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a 
                                              
and withholding of removal, and we therefore consider these claims waived.  See 
Laborers’ Int’l Union v. Foster Wheeler Energy Corp., 26 F.3d 375, 398 (3d Cir. 1994) 
(“An issue is waived unless a party raises it in its opening brief, and for those purposes a 
passing reference to an issue . . . will not suffice to bring that issue before this court.”) 
(internal quotation marks and citation omitted). 
  
6 The BIA had jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1103 and 8 C.F.R. § 1003.1(b)(3).  
We have appellate jurisdiction pursuant to 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a). 
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public official who has custody or physical control of the victim . . . and . . . [did] not 
aris[e] from lawful sanctions.”  Auguste v. Ridge, 395 F.3d 123, 151 (3d Cir. 2005).  The 
determination that a CAT applicant is (or is not) likely to be tortured in the future is a 
factual finding that we review under the substantial evidence standard.  See Kaplun v. 
Att’y Gen., 602 F.3d 260, 271-72 (3d Cir. 2010).   
 Sutaj argues in a conclusory fashion that “the agency record reflects the Frroku 
brothers’ ability to inflict torture and death upon the Petitioner with the acquiescence of 
corrupt government elements with direct ties to the Frroku brothers.” Sutaj Br. at 12.  He 
also argues that, as shown by Dr. Arsovska’s testimony, organized crime has so 
thoroughly infiltrated the Albanian government that the “official acquiescence” 
requirement is satisfied on a theory of “willful blindness.” Sutaj Br. at 17 (citing Matter 
of W-G-R-, 26 I & N Dec. 208, 226 (BIA 2014); see also Myrie, 855 F.3d at 516 
(“Circumstantial evidence may establish acquiescence to targeted acts of violence even 
when the government has an official policy or is engaged in a campaign of opposition 
against the entity the applicant fears.”).  Finally, he argues that the BIA failed to properly 
credit the fact that the IJ had found his testimony credible. 
 While we accept the IJ’s finding that Sutaj’s testimony was credible, we cannot 
conclude that the record as a whole compels a conclusion contrary to the one reached by 
the BIA.  While Sutaj alleges that he was in constant fear for his life after the 
assassination of Lamaj, the record evidence points in the opposite direction: Sutaj 
returned to Tirana from Pukë in 2015 seeking work, notwithstanding his alleged fears for 
his personal safety, and he travelled to and from Albania at least twice using his Albanian 
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passport, during the time in which he was ostensibly in hiding, in fear for his life were his 
identity to be exposed. On neither of these trips did he seek asylum or any other form of 
relief, choosing instead to return to Albania. We agree with the BIA that substantial 
evidence supports the IJ’s conclusion that Sutaj would not be subject to torture upon his 
return to Albania, much less that torture at the instigation, or with the acquiescence of, 
government officials would occur. 
 Sutaj also argues that the IJ “particularly erred” in concluding that Dr. Arsovska’s 
export report did not “contain[] any information that is specific to respondent.” Sutaj Br. 
at 28.  We do not agree.  While Dr. Arsovska was accepted by the IJ as an Albanian 
country expert and opined that there was a “great chance” that Sutaj would be killed or 
tortured if returned to Albania, (AR at 292), her testimony as a whole is bereft of 
evidence corroborating Sutaj’s claims of a personal role in the official investigation of the 
Frroku brothers or his connection to Lamaj.  Indeed, Dr. Arsovska conceded on cross-
examination that she did not pursue any such evidence with her sources in Albania nor 
could she verify that Sutaj had ever worked with Lamaj, much less that the work had 
involved an investigation of the Frroku brothers.  Nor could she independently confirm 
the incident in which Sutaj alleged that he had been stopped and shot at while driving to 
his sister’s home. Finally, she testified that she was unaware that Sutaj had traveled freely 
to and from Albania on more than one occasion when he was allegedly in hiding in fear 
of his life. 
 In sum, we do not believe that the record compels a conclusion contrary to the 
BIA’s finding that this “generalized evidence [was] insufficient to establish the 
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applicant’s eligibility for relief under the CAT.”  (AR at 7).  See Sevoian v. Ashcroft, 290 
F.3d 166, 175 (3d Cir. 2002) (petitioner seeking CAT protection must show “by objective 
evidence” that it is more likely than not that he or she would be tortured if removed to the 
proposed country of removal).  While we do not diminish Dr. Arsovska’s testimony that 
organized crime is a serious public menace in Albania, that general proposition, however 
true, does not standing alone entitle Sutaj (or any other Albanian citizen) to personal 
relief under CAT.7  
III. Conclusion 
 Because the record evidence supports the conclusions of the BIA and the IJ that 
Sutaj had failed to establish that it was more likely than not that he would be subject to 
torture with the acquiescence of government officials were he to be returned to Albania, 
we deny the petition. 
                                              
 7 In a final bid for reversal, Sutaj faults the BIA for violating his due process rights 
by neglecting to consider “evidence relevant to the possibility of future torture.” Sutaj Br. 
at 35 (quoting 8 C.F.R. § 1208.16(c)(3)). He takes issue, in particular, with the BIA’s 
observation that he had not been asked to testify against the Frroku brothers. While the 
thrust of the argument is not altogether apparent, it is clear that this was only one piece of 
the evidence that the BIA reviewed in rejecting Sutaj’s CAT claim. Far from any rush to 
judgment, the BIA remanded the case to the IJ to compile additional evidence, including 
Dr. Arsovska’s testimony, on the prospect that Sutaj might likely be subject to torture by 
the Frrokus or their catspaws. In our view, Sutaj received all of the process which he was 
due, and more.  
